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Abstract 
This research paper contributes to the literature of white-collar crime by using a unique data 
set of aggregated monthly white-collar crime incidents for Paraguay. The time series includes 
data from 2000–2016. Furthermore, a seasonal ARIMA model is presented to model the data. 
Findings show that white-collar crime has increased more than 800 percent and crime rate 
more than 640 percent respectively, with a peak in 2015. Fraud and violation of trust contribute 
to over 91 percent of aggregated white-collar crime. A prediction for 2017 indicates a slight 
decrease of 5.7 percent compared to 2016.  
Keywords: White-collar crime, Paraguay, ARIMA models, Time series, Model selection, 
Akaike weights 
Introduction 
While preparing this paper the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht has caused a kind 
of corruption earthquake in eleven Latin American countries. Corruption in Latin America is not 
a surprise. Local habitants of these countries already know since quite a while who is who of 
their local representatives who’s white collar is turning grey or black. Even the social and 
economic magnitude is not a big surprise. It is widely known that corruption involves public 
servants – often high ranking officials – and that corruption moves millions of US dollars each 
year. What is kind of surprising is the public attitude against corruption in most of the affected 
countries, represented by public enforcement agencies and sentences of the justice system. 
They simply apply current existing law, regardless of the offender’s social or economic status, 
and do not hesitate to accuse or sentence to prison high public officials, senators, vice 
presidents or even presidents. It might be a kind of political re-contribution to society before 
elections, avoiding public anger and social unrest or protecting local economy by avoiding loss 
of reputation preserving foreign direct investments. While the sudden change of heart is 
unclear, they are sending out a signal of hope for the region. 
 
The term White-collar crime was first coined by Edwin H. Sutherland in 1939, with the objective 
to draw criminologists’ attention to the “upper class” which also commit crime, but has been 
overlooked so far. This upper or white collar class is mostly composed by respected, socially 
accepted and approved business or professional men (Sutherland, 1940) – in other words: 
trusted persons of the society. White-collar crime is not a legal category with a list of specific 
offenses. The term is more like a social concept rather than a definition. For instance, it is 
unclear if the term describes the offender, its social status, types of offenses or the modus 
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operandi of the behavior (Shapiro, 1980). The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines 
white-collar crime in terms of the offense as 
 
[C] those illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment or violation of trust and 
which are not dependent upon the application of threat of physical force or violence. 
Individuals and organizations commit these acts to obtain money, property or services; to 
avoid the loss of money or services; or to secure personal or business advantage (USDOJ, 
1989: 3). 
The personal or business advantage mentioned above is, furthermore, mostly intended to be 
obtained in a short time period, a characteristic mostly overlooked. This definition has a more 
practical approach due to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data base, because there 
are no indicators of the socioeconomic status or occupation of the offender (Barnett, n. d.). 
While Sutherland’s contributions to white-collar crime and criminology have been 
acknowledged by criminologists around the world, some scholars also found that he created 
more confusion, because of his ambiguous definition (Friedrich, 2010; Shapiro, 1980).  
On the other hand, at one end of the white-collar crime equation will always be the offender. 
So, it makes sense to analyze why they do what they do. They do not belong to a “repressed 
minority”, they are generally from respected families, well-educated and not poor. But they are 
‘leaders’ in high-ranking positions which are able to find or even create opportunities and 
convince some ‘followers’ for private gains (Bucy et al., 2008; Shapiro, 1990). Until today, as 
it seems, there is no universal definition of the term white-collar crime. White-collar crime 
examples are public corruption, tax evasion, environmental law violations, bankruptcy fraud, 
bribery, money laundering and embezzlement to name a few. 
 
Crime can be observed in societies of all types, but any kind of crime that reaches excessively 
high levels is pathological in nature. It offends and hurts collective feelings (Durkheim, 1982). 
Paraguay has been historically less transparent than other countries. Hence, there is no 
research or literature about white-collar crime, except of some international organizations like 
World Bank or Transparency International who report about public corruption on a continuously 
basis. This lack of research is mostly due to a lack of primary data. One of the aims of this 
research paper is to fill this gap with an analysis of a first-hand data set on white-collar crime 
incidents. The second objective is to model white-collar crime data with the intention to serve 
as a basis for public policymakers. 
 
After this introduction a literature review analysis different aspects of white-collar crime, 
followed by the empirical part of this paper. Next, results will be presented, before concluding 
with a discussion and recommendations for further research. 
Literature Review 
White-collar crime has been studied for a while from different perspectives and a variety of 
subfields in numerous countries around the globe. For example, Agnew (1992, 2001) 
examined the effect of selected types of strain on crime and which types of strains are most 
likely to lead to crime, for example, such that are seen as unjust which is more likely to create 
strong emotions like anger. Unjust can be defined as “the voluntary and intentional violation of 
a relevant justice norm” (Agnew 2001: 329). 
Three characteristics of white-collar crime are particularly important: (1) The offender has 
legitimate access to the target or victim of the crime on the basis of an occupational position, 
which constitutes his or her primary activity; (2) the offender must involve the power of his 
position to obtain an increase in economic, political or social standing of himself or the 
organization to harm one or more victims and (3) the offender’s actions have a superficial 
appearance of legality (Henry and McGurrin, 2013). 
 
  
In general, white-collar crime is a non-violent crime, but not a victimless crime. It is different 
than street crime, it is more difficult to understand and even sometimes difficult to recognize, 
with much more victims and more harmful than its counterpart. These acts and sometimes 
omissions are not only wrongs against the victims, there are also against the state or 
government who is responsible for maintaining public morals, health, safety and order (Cassel 
and Bernstein, 2015).  Therefore, every criminal judgment is also a social judgment because 
laws are considered ‘the will of the people’ and should serve us as a guide for all our practical 
reasoning (Cassel and Bernstein, 2015: 4; Durkheim, 1982).  White-collar crime seems to be 
a highly significant social problem in the first place, regardless if it should be considered crime 
or not (Newman, 1958). 
Offenders, as a group, who participate in illegitimate activities respond to incentives in much 
the same way as non-offenders who are engaged in legitimate activities (Ehrlich, 1973). This 
led Ehrlich (1996, also Becker, 1968) to his ‘market model’ of offenses, where all participants 
act to optimize the relations of costs/benefits. Money, financial gain and greed are the most 
common motives for white-collar offenders according to Bucy et al. (2008) who interviewed 
prosecutors, defense counsels and white-collar offenders. They argue that the group of 
offenders can be divided into ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’, each with different personality traits. 
According to the authors the key deterring and detecting is “an informed, active Board of 
Directors with an adequate number of outside qualified directors [C]” (p. 436). Wrong or even 
perverse incentives, like low penalties for abuse, poor accounting and lax regulations will help 
to create environments for white-collar crime (Akerlof and Romer, 1993; Black, 2010). Ehrlich 
(1996) and Black (2010) go even further and argue that only prison sentences or sentencing 
guidelines shift the tax for crime and can deter the willful violations.  It even seems that white-
collar crime has resulted in a kind of Pavlov’s conditional stimulus-response learning effect. 
Despite the argument of Banerjee (1992) that socially inefficient herding will bring up 
mechanisms that reduces herding by modifying the payoff structure, social and economic costs 
of white-collar offenders are by far higher than ordinary street crime. The Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (2016) reported in his latest report that occupational fraud caused 
an estimated total loss of US$6.3 Billion, the median loss for Latin America is about 
US$174.000 per case, financial statement fraud is the category which causes by far the 
greatest median loss while Owners and Executives causes 10-times more damage. 
There is a broad consensus in academic literature that corruption has a negative impact on 
economic growth. For example, corruption can impact negatively Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), because it increases cost of doing business, creates mistrust and with a corrupt justice 
system investments do not seem to be save (Barassi and Zhou, 2012; Javorcik and Wei, 2009; 
Mauro, 1995). Transparency International (2017a) ranked Paraguay 123 in his latest corruption 
perceptions index (out of 176 countries) and second most corrupt in South America. 
Paraguayans are most likely to say that their elected representatives are highly corrupt (69 
percent), but they also say (82 percent) that citizens could play a major role in fighting 
corruption (TI, 2017b). Detotto and Otranto (2010) analyzed the impact of crime and economic 
growth in Italy. They summarized that crime discourages domestic and foreign direct 
investment, creating uncertainty and reduces competiveness of firms by obscuring and 
distorting market reality. Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) argue that corruption and economic 
growth depends in great part of the political regime and quality of institutions. While corruption 
in free countries can be beneficial for economic growth on a low level of incidence, mostly due 
to high bureaucracy, it is harmful on a high level of incidence. This can be confirmed by Auriol, 
Straub and Flochel (2016). They found out in a more recent research that corruption in the 
allocation of public contracts has damaging consequences for the economy in Paraguay. First, 
it destroys entrepreneurs’ development potential and second, this kind of rent-seeking directs 
towards unproductive activities, which results in one of the least industrialized economy in the 
region. 
But the consequences are not only of economic nature. Despite of the individual economic 
losses, directly caused by the fraud itself and indirectly caused by contracting a law firm and 
opportunity costs, there are also social consequences. Distrust or cynicism against the justice 
system or public institutions in general, or emotional consequences like anxiety disorder, major 
  
depressive episodes or even suicidal tendencies are mentioned in literature. White-collar crime 
can sometimes even involve physical harm from polluting the environment with toxic waste, 
unsafe working conditions or from marketing unsafe products (Brody and Kiehl, 2010; 
Friedrichs, 2010; Ganzini et al., 1990; Malone, 2010; Payne, 2016; Pridmore and Reddy, 2012; 
Seligson, 2006). Sutherland (1940: 5) argues that “white-collar crimes violate trust and 
therefore create distrust, which produces social disorganization on a large scale.”  
Other research focused on psychological characteristics of white-collar offenders. Low 
integrity, high hedonism and high narcissism are psychological variables which may predict 
business white-collar crime (Blickle et al., 2006; O’Brien, 2017). Age, however, always 
correlated with crime, is almost always reported and therefore easily available. However, the 
causes of deviations are likely to be the same at any age. (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983). 
Shared religious beliefs and the importance of god in one’s life are negatively related to white-
collar crime (Corcoran, Robbins and Pettinicchio, 2012).  
Other types of white-collar crime like fraud, violation of trust, extortion and others show a 
lack of research and especially in the case of Paraguay. In general, white-collar crime is 
underrepresented in literature relative to street crime (McGurrin et al., 2013). This is mostly 
due to the lack of data. The primary objective of this paper is to fill the lack of research with an 
analysis of a primary data set, which spans the period from the years 2000-2016. 
Data and Methods 
Data set 
White-collar crime primary data were obtained from the office of the Public Prosecutor as the 
only public institution to prosecute offenders and hence, the sole source of data.2 For the 
purpose of this paper an offense-based definition of white-collar crime was defined and 
categorized corresponding to the national law No. 1.160/97 (Penal Code, General part, Title 
II, Chapter III, ‘Punishable offenses against patrimony’).3 The chapter consists of nine offenses 
(Articles), namely extortion (Art. 185), aggravated extortion (Art. 186), fraud, (Art. 187), 
fraudulent computer operations (Art. 188), clandestine exploitation of a benefit (Art. 189), 
sinister with intent to cheat (Art. 190), fraudulent investment promotions (Art. 191), violation of 
trust (Art. 192) and usury (Art. 193). 
 
The month of January and February 2000 had no reported incidents at all and therefore were 
excluded from the series. Monthly aggregated data of all nine punishable offenses from March 
2000 to December 2016 are available and were included in the time series. Then all nine 
Articles were aggregated to a univariate series named white-collar crime with the aim to 
explore for long term and seasonal patterns. No further distinctions were made regarding 
geography, age, gender or race. For the time period observed, the office of the Public 
Prosecutor counted, on average, of 13 expert/forensic accountant to cover the entire country.4 
 
The office of the Public Prosecutor created a special unit for financial crime and anticorruption 
(UDEA)5 which is operative since 2007. Data are available since 2011 and are included in the 
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3. The Paraguayan Penal code is heavily based on the German “Strafgesetzbuch” (StGB)  
without taking into account cultural and social differences. 
4 Office of the Public Prosecutor, Department of Public Information, March 20, 2017. 
 
5 UDEA = Unidad especializada en Delitos Económicos y Anticorrupción. The Unit has limitations and is just able 
to act in the city of Asuncion (capital), passing a certain amount and if a public institution is a victim. In special cases 
the attorney general can advise the special unit to investigate.  
 
  
data set. The average participation of the special unit is 0.90 percent of the total cases reported 
during the period 2011-2016. 
Corruption itself, as a punishable offense, is not included in the above mentioned chapter and 
therefore not included in the series.6 In practice, corruption is generally complained along with 
violation of trust and hence, violation of trust can be seen as a proxy for corruption. In fact, 
violation of trust, investigated by the special unit increased from 2011 until 2014 by 267 percent 
and dropped then 47 percent until the end of 2016. Violation of trust counts for 58.91 percent 
and fraud for 30 percent (n=404) of all cases investigated by UDEA. These numbers show the 
focus of the special unit. Figure 1a shows the index and evolution of white-collar crime in 
Paraguay, with a peak of 9,137 cases in 2015, while figure 1b shows the white-collar crime 
rate. 
Figure 1a. White-collar crime index Paraguay 2000 - 2016. 
 
                                                                    
6 Public corruption is regulated in Title VIII, Chapter III, Art. 300-304 of the Paraguayan  
Penal Code. 
  
Figure 1b. White-collar crime rate Paraguay 2000 - 2016. 
 
Statistical analysis 
During the observed period of 202 month, there were a total of 67,907 offenses counted. The 
most frequent offense was fraud with 48,879 counts (71.98 percent), followed by violation of 
trust (n=13,167; 19.39 percent) and extortion (n=4,349; 6.40 percent). The remaining six 
offenses in this chapter count for a total of 1,512 cases (2.23 percent). The average count of 
offenses during the time period observed is 3,995 per year with a standard deviation of 2,927, 
a minimum of 987 (2000) and a maximum of 9,137 cases in 2015. Table 1 shows a resume of 
the descriptive statistics of all offenses. 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics and distribution of white-collar crime offenses. 
 
While white-collar crime rate is mostly presented in literature and official statistics, the original 
raw data is preferred in this study to avoid an artificial bias. Including the population of 
Article Offense Total counts % of total
185 Extortion 4,349 6.40%
186 Aggravated Extortion 217 0.32%
187 Fraud 48,879 71.98%
188 Fraudulent computer operations 2 0.00%
189 Clandestine exploitation of a benefit 738 1.09%
190 Sinister with intent to cheat 3 0.00%
191 Fraudulent investment promotions 45 0.07%
192 Violation of trust 13,167 19.39%
193 Usury 507 0.75%
67,907 100.00%
Note: Offenses are ordered by their respective articles as per Chapter III of the 
corresponding law, Total counts = total counts per offence from 2000 - 2016.
mean = 3,995; Stdv. = 2,927; min = 987; max = 9,137
  
Paraguay to compute a crime rate would convert the data set to a non-time-continuous process 
(Bramness et al., 2015). Time series variables are related and ordered according to time, which 
is an important characteristic of time series (Shumway and Stoffer, 2011). Furthermore, both 
graphs have the same structural shape characterized mainly by fraud and violation of trust 
incidents. 
One of the two purposes of this study is to create a model by fitting the time series and be able 
to forecast white-collar crime. A first step involves a careful scrutiny of the time plotted data as 
shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. White-collar crime Paraguay 2000 - 2016.  
 
The data shows a clear non-linearity series with no consistent trend. After a decline from 2002 
to 2006, the series shows a strong increasing trend from 2007 to 2015 with a systematic 
change in the mean level.  A histogram of the original data reveals a skewed right data set 
(skewness=0.72) due to the (naturally truncated) lower bound (zero), with a mean of 
approximately 336 and a median of 240 counts per month (Figure 3). 
After a first inspection of the data, some issues occurred like non-linearity, seasonality, serial 
autocorrelation and overdispersion, nevertheless a classical ARIMA model was chosen to 
model the data and make predictions, due to its widely acceptance and robustness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.  Histogram of original dataset. 
 
Seasonality that is, an observable, repeated shape around the trend in a one year time period, 
and can be of different nature like weather, timing of decisions, which have transformed into 
traditions, calendar and expectation (Granger, 1979). Monthly data is almost equally 
distributed and does not reveal large amplitudes in variance on a yearly basis, but a seasonal 
pattern in this particular research can be observed in a box-whisker plot with a clear peak in 
October and a valley in January, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  Box – whisker plot of original dataset. 
 
This is probably caused by a calendar event (initiating criminal complaints before the 
jurisdictional summer break during the hottest months in January to mid of February) and by 
expectation based on claims on additional income in December. 
 
The original raw data was then splitted into a training set and testing set by means of a Pareto 
ratio. Non-stationary data, as a rule, are unpredictable and therefore most techniques require 
a stationary series to perform forecasts. The random nature of the additive error process 
guarantees that forecasts will not be close to true values. As already mentioned above, the 
  
original raw data is a unit root process, for that reason shocks have a permanent effect and do 
not revert to the mean. Therefore, the next step was to transform the training set into stationary 
data. Stationarity in a time series means, that mean and variance are roughly the same over 
time. Different techniques were applied to transform the data and to smooth the series, such 
as first and second order differences, as well as log normal function.  Subsequently, an 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF, Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) and a KPSS Test 
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), as well as a Canova Hansen Test (Canova and Hansen, 1995) for 
seasonal stability were performed with the aim to observe a more stationary data set. Before 
implementing the ADF test, an important issue is to select the lag length p. If p is to small then 
the remaining correlation of the residuals will bias the test, and if p is too large then the power 
of the test will suffer. Monte Carlo simulations suggest it is better to error on the side of too 
many lags. For an approximation the following equation was used (Schwert, 1989): 
        (1) 
After resolving the equation, the approximate lag length is about 13, where T denotes the 
observations (161 observations in the training set). A standard error of p=0.05 was established 
to reject or accept the null hypothesis for the ADF and KPSS test. The first order difference of 
the raw data shows a stationary series on a 10 percent level for the ADF test and supports the 
null hypothesis of Stationarity on a 1 percent level for the KPSS test. For a second order 
differenced series the null of a unit root process can be rejected at all levels for the ADF test, 
while the null of Stationarity for the KPSS test cannot be rejected at all levels, assuming a 
stationary series. The Canova-Hansen test shows a stable seasonal pattern for all transformed 
data sets, even for the original raw data (Table 2). 
Table 2. Stationarity tests for different data transformation. 
 
Model selection 
For a first seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average model (ARIMA) estimation with 
the general form (p,d,q) (P,D,Q)m, the stationary series of second order differenced data 
(Diff2Orig) was used. The correlogram of the stationary series indicates an ARMA (5,0,2) 
process as a starting point (Figure 5). The seasonal component (0,2,2) was also included. Six 
different model candidates were tested on the training set. 
Stationariety Tests for different data transformations on Training set
Test
ADF Test (L=13) "none"
p.-Value
Critical values 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
-2.58 -1.95 -1.62 -2.58 -1.95 -1.62 -2.58 -1.95 -1.62 -2.58 -1.95 -1.62 -2.58 -1.95 -1.62
KPSS Test (L=13)
p.-Value
Critical values 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1%
0.119 0.146 0.216 0.119 0.146 0.216 0.119 0.146 0.216 0.119 0.146 0.216 0.119 0.146 0.216
Canova Hansen Test
p.-Value
Critical values 2.49 2.75 3.27 2.49 2.75 3.27 2.49 2.75 3.27 2.49 2.75 3.27 2.49 2.75 3.27
nsdiffs (Test="ch")
-8.1115
0.245 0.1455 0.147 0.0540.2826
1.4745 0.5856 -2.4757 -1.9212
Original variable logOrig DifflogOrig DiffOrig Diff2Orig
1.557 1.593 1.546 1.526 1.497
Notes: Original variable=Original crime counts without any transformation; logOrig=natural logarithm of original variable; DifflogOrig=first 
difference of natural logarithm of original variable; DiffOrig=first difference of original variable; Diff2Orig=difference of second order of 
original variable. 
0 0 0 0 0
  
Figure 5.  Correlogram of the stationary series. 
 
The widely used Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973), as an objective measure of 
the “goodness of fit”, was used as a model selection criterion for this multiple model set.  The 
lowest AIC value should indicate the best model fit with the lowest information loss and with 
the best predictions when applied to new data. However, the AIC column in Table 3 shows a 
very small difference between model M5 (1,310.02) and M6 (1,310.59) in the training set. This 
makes it difficult to decide if the difference between M5, with the lowest AIC, to model M6 is 
statistically important. Furthermore, the log likelihood measure shows almost the same value 
for the two models, which indicates model redundancy. 
Therefore, a weighted AIC ratio was used, as proposed by Wagenmakers and Farrell (2004), 
to address this uncertainty in model selection. Akaike weights should give more evidence for 
one model over another model. As a first step, the differences between the model with the best 
AIC value and the competing models are calculated. That is,  
∆ᵢ (AIC) = AICᵢ - minAIC     (2) 
Models with ∆ᵢ ≤ 2 have strong support, whereas, on the other extreme, models with ∆ᵢ ≥ 10 
have no substantial evidence (Burnham and Anderson 2004). Next, the Akaike weights, ωᵢ 
AIC, should sum up to 1 and are obtained by  
ωi =
exp−0.5ΔᵢAIC
∑ exp−0.5ΔᵢAIC
 
    (3) 
In the training set the Akaike weights for M6 (0.32) and M5 (0.43) show almost equal values, 
with slightly more evidence for M5, while all other models reveal 4 ≤ ∆ᵢ ≤ 7 and therefore 
considerable less support. It is good practice to study the residuals of the sample. A first choice 
is the residuals’ autocorrelation plot. In addition, a statistical Ljung Box test was applied. Low 
p-values indicate a lack of evidence for independency of the deviants (Box and Pierce, 1970; 
Ljung and Box, 1978). The same model set was then tested on new data (test set) for a 
prediction. The weighted AIC ratio shows now a stronger support for M6 (0.61) over M5 (0.34), 
while ∆ᵢ (AIC) shows almost no support for any other model. Recall that for the training set M5 
was the preferred model. In other words, M6 is now 1.8 times more likely to be the best model 
and with a (normalized) probability of about 65 percent M6 would predict better results than 
M5. The Ljung-Box test supports evidence that the residuals can be assumed as independent. 
Table 3 provides a statistical summary of the multiple model set tested on an in-sample and 
out-of-sample data set. 
  
Table 3. Statistical summary of accuracy measurements of different models.  
  
Figure 6 shows the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations (acf and pacf) of the residuals 
of model M6. All lags (with one exception due to chance) are between the upper and lower 
confidence bounds and statistically not significant. 
 
Figure 6.  Autocorrelations of selected model M6. 
 
A histogram and a normal probability plot of the residuals support the assumption of a 
reasonable normal distribution (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accuracy measures for different  ARIMA models on training and test set
M ARIMA model RMSE MAE MAPE MASE AIC Ljung Box logL ∆ᵢ (AIC) ωᵢ (AIC)
1 (2,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 37.66139 27.0051 14.971 0.387240 1313.36 0.071 -655.678 3.34 0.0808
2 (3,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 35.13080 24.4824 13.726 0.351066 1313.63 0.439 -655.815 3.61 0.0706
3 (4,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 35.13705 24.6389 13.826 0.353311 1314.00 0.296 -656.002 3.98 0.0587
4 (5,0,1)(0,2,2)[12] 37.78036 26.6443 14.732 0.382067 1314.90 0.086 -656.449 4.88 0.0374
5 (5,0,2)(0,2,2)[12] 35.63795 25.9354 14.326 0.371902 1310.02 0.488 -654.012 0.00 0.4294
6 (5,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 35.82379 26.0546 14.350 0.373611 1310.59 0.275 -654.296 0.57 0.3229
Test Set 1 (2,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 43.22982 29.6880 14.649 0.420206 1472.45 0.964 -735.227 14.54 0.0004
2 (3,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 39.25022 26.4828 13.357 0.374540 1464.74 0.590 -731.372 6.83 0.0202
3 (4,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 39.12505 26.5692 13.439 0.376063 1464.21 0.899 -731.104 6.30 0.0263
4 (5,0,1)(0,2,2)[12] 42.71612 29.2689 14.418 0.414127 1469.96 0.992 -733.982 12.05 0.0015
5 (5,0,2)(0,2,2)[12] 39.59277 28.2375 13.974 0.399676 1459.11 0.602 -728.554 1.20 0.3372
6 (5,0,3)(0,2,2)[12] 39.52104 28.3303 13.999 0.400990 1457.91 0.889 -727.954 0.00 0.6144
Training 
Set
Note: RMSE = Root mean square error of model ᵢ ; MAE = Mean average error; MAPE = Mean average percentage 
error;  MASE = Mean absulte scaled error; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; Ljung Box = test for independence of 
residuals; logL = natural logarithm of the maximum likelihood of model ᵢ ; ∆ᵢ (AIC) = (AICᵢ - minAIC); ωᵢ (AIC) = Akaike 
weigths.
  
Figure 7.  Distribution of the residuals of the selected model. 
 
A prediction for 2017 was made based on model M6. Total white-collar crime counts would 
therefore be between 5,655 and 9,048 offenses in a lower and upper 95 percent confidence 
bound and a 5 percent error margin. The average point estimate is about 7,351 offenses at the 
end of 2017. That would mean a decrease of 5.7 percent compared to 2016. 
Key Findings 
White-collar crime incidence increased 826 percent since 2000 with its peak in 2015. While 
white-collar crime rate increased 644.76 percent with its peak in 2014 and 139 incidents per 
100.000 habitants. In these new created measures fraud with a total of 48,879 incidents (71.98 
percent) and violation of trust with a total of 13,167 (19.39 percent) cases are the main offenses 
responsible for the increasing trend. Fraud alone increased 946 percent from 2000 till 2015. 
The yearly average during the observed time span is 3,995 offenses. Shocks can be observed 
in 2001, 2009 and 2011. 
 
The univariate time series seems to a have a seasonal component. A slight peak in the month 
of October and a valley in January can be observed, different from the mean of 336 offenses 
per month, probably caused by a calendar event and expectation. 
 
White-collar crime offenses will continue on a high level in 2017, with a mean far above the 
series mean of 3.995 counts. It is estimated that total offenses for 2017 will be, on average, 
around 7,351 cases with a variance (σ2) of 1,697 at a 95 percent confidence interval. This 
would indicate a decrease of around 5.7 percent compared to the previous year. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper has presented the first descriptive data on white-collar crime for Paraguay for a 
time span from 2000-2016. Furthermore, an aggregated monthly time series of white-collar 
crime incidents has been analyzed and modeled, with the intention to predict the following year 
in the series. 
 
The results indicate a dramatically increase in white-collar crime offenses. It can also be 
assumed that the true numbers of offenses are much higher than indicated, as many victims 
do not present official complaints due to (additional) costs or mistrust towards the justice 
system. While the special unit against financial crime and anti-corruption has just a small 
impact in prosecution in this research, the vast majority of the victims depend on the expertise 
or good-will of the local prosecutor of the case. Therefore, the radius of action for the special 
  
unit should be less restrictive to make better use of human resources and their technical 
knowledge to guarantee a better service to society. Similarly, more prosecutors should be 
instructed (e.g. by the special unit) in white-collar crime and financial crime and be present in 
every larger city. Some of the law chapter articles have extremely low counts considering the 
time span and therefore should be revised. 
  
Macroeconomic variables of Paraguay, generally associated as a mitigating factor of crime, 
are sound with an average GDP growth rate of about 3.64 percent and a GDP per capita 
average growth rate of 2.1 percent over the same time period of this research. The financial 
crises during 2007-2008 did not affect Paraguay (Guillén, 2011), but hit the agricultural and 
other dependent sectors hard (e.g. transport) due to climate change (draught), which caused 
a 25 percent decline in production and around 4 percent in GDP in 2009. White-collar crime 
increased about 80 percent in the same year.  However, GDP increased in the following years, 
and so did white-collar crime. It seems that white-collar crime did not affect economic growth 
in Paraguay. This seems logical taking into consideration the most common motives for white-
collar offenders. An increasing economy is a healthy ground for more opportunities. The theory 
that an economic downturn will increase unemployment and therefore increase crime may hold 
for ‘street crime’, but it is not obvious for white-collar crime. 
 
It should be noted that the offenses grouped here as white-collar crimes do not span the scale 
of offenses that can and should be regarded as white-collar crime. For example, public 
corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion, money laundering, bankruptcy fraud and bribery are 
notably absent. Nevertheless, the data indicates clearly an epidemic problem. 
Therefore, conducting further empirical studies is recommended and required to better 
understand white-collar crime in Paraguay. Research could answer the questions if there is a 
contagion or learning effect in society or how does society behave towards white-collar crime.  
This paper should be seen as a first step in this direction and also to get more awareness of 
public policymakers. 
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